The protests against the Islamic regime in Iran have most likely passed the point of no return. Thousands of people, mostly young, have been brutally killed by the regime’s enforcers. This brutality echoes the conduct of past totalitarian dictatorships, where liberation movements were met with terror and indiscriminate violence. A useful historical analogy is Budapest in 1956, with one important distinction: the communist regime in Hungary was not nearly as brutal as the Islamic regime in Iran, and many of the worst atrocities were committed by invading Soviet troops confronting largely unarmed protesters. I raise the Hungarian tragedy to caution against the triumphalism that has become common among many Iran watchers today. If one prefers a more recent example, the Chinese Communist Party’s crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989 offers a similarly sobering reminder.

History is not a linear progression in which civilization automatically advances toward justice. A just order does not establish itself without deliberate action. When discussing the protests in Iran, it is therefore wiser to think probabilistically rather than triumphantly.

The unrest has been triggered by a combination of factors rooted in the nature of the totalitarian Islamist regime, which has subjected its population to relentless oppression. Countless executions, persistent conflict with the Western world—including the recent twelve-day war that exposed deep dysfunction within the regime—and the imposition of fundamentalist norms on a younger generation have all played an important role in fueling the protests.

Demographic change is also central. Iran’s median age is now thirty-five, meaning that a majority of the population was born after the Islamist revolution of 1979. This generation is largely devoid of ideological or emotional attachment to the regime’s founding mythology.

A third dimension is systemic mismanagement and corruption, much of it a byproduct of the patronage networks maintained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the single most powerful institution in the country. The IRGC effectively controls major sectors of the economy, including oil production, and plays a central role in sustaining the regime’s grip on power. Compounding these problems is a severe water crisis, felt even in Tehran, particularly given Iran’s arid climate.

The combination of isolation, corruption, misrule, and Islamist tyranny has produced sustained unrest as Iranian youth grow increasingly skeptical of the mullahs’ ability to govern. This culminated in mass demonstrations, followed by an exceptionally brutal crackdown and the killing of thousands of innocent people. Simultaneously, the regime launched propaganda campaigns accusing protesters of “disrupting public order,” providing justification for mass arrests.

The regime now faces a strategic dilemma. It can either liberalize and initiate gradual reforms in a Gorbachev-style process of glasnost and perestroika, or it can continue down a path of repression, further delegitimizing itself as younger generations refuse to live under clerical rule. International reactions suggest that Iran’s elites are divided, and that this split is likely to deepen.

On one side are elements of the regular army and civilian institutions that may be open to systemic change, normalization with Israel and the United States, and the dismantling of the Sharia-based political order. On the other is a militant faction within the IRGC determined to retain power through extreme repression.

A parallel can be drawn with the failed August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union, when hardliners sought to reverse Gorbachev’s reforms and reassert control. The IRGC, which effectively dominates Iran, similarly seeks to turn the clock backward. Yet another precedent must also be considered: China in 1989, where mass repression succeeded in preventing regime collapse after the Tiananmen Square massacre. For this reason, Iran’s future should be assessed probabilistically. While regime collapse in the near term appears more likely than not, there remains a smaller but real possibility that it could entrench itself for decades despite deteriorating conditions. Budapest in 1956 stands as a reminder that even heroic popular uprisings can fail when confronted by determined force and international indifference.

The international environment today, however, differs markedly from that of the Cold War. Neither China nor Russia is likely to risk a direct confrontation with the West for the sake of preserving Iran’s Islamist regime. Russia is consumed by its war in Ukraine, while China remains cautious about entanglement in foreign conflicts. This creates greater space for U.S. and Israeli influence. President Trump is likely pursuing backchannel diplomacy aimed at extracting meaningful concessions, including the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and an end to its destabilizing regional activities. At the same time, there is reluctance to provoke uncontrolled collapse, with preference given to encouraging transformation from within. The broader objective is to convert a hostile revolutionary state into a potential regional stabilizer.

It is increasingly evident that Iran’s younger generation, across ethnic lines, no longer embraces the rigid Shiite dogmas imposed by the regime—a rejection shaped by decades of clerical despotism. The system now relies far more on coercion than on genuine legitimacy, resembling the late Soviet period, when belief in communist ideology had largely evaporated and the KGB became the primary pillar of control. Islamism has receded significantly from Iranian society, and the authority of the mullahs alone is no longer sufficient to sustain the system. Instead, a narrow clique of IRGC generals seeks to preserve the regime at all costs, a strategy that risks severe internal backlash.

Ultimately, the fate of the Iranian regime will not be determined by slogans, external commentary, or hopeful projections, but by the interaction between internal fracture and external restraint. History shows that totalitarian systems can appear immovable until they suddenly collapse, yet it also shows that they can survive far longer than observers expect when repression remains effective. Iran now stands at this uncertain intersection. What is already clear is that a profound generational, demographic, and moral shift has taken place. Whether the regime adapts to this reality or attempts to crush it will shape not only its own survival, but the future of Iranian society and its role in the region.

Ziya H. is a Contributor for Liberty Affair. Based in Warsaw, Poland, he writes about geopolitics, culture, and technology. Follow his latest insights on X: @hsnlizi.